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Peremptory Challenges and the
Meaning of Jury Representation
The Sixth Amendment requires that juries be impartial,1 and both
judicial doctrines and an elaborate system of jury selection preserve
this right. In Taylor v. Louisiana,2 the Supreme Court held that the
requirement of impartiality includes a requirement that juries be
selected from a cross section of the community.3 Because the jury acts
as the representative of society, distinctive groups may not be excluded
from the jury pool.- The California and Massachussets Supreme Courts
recently extended these notions of representation and impartiality to
rule that the peremptory challenge may not be used systematically to
exclude members of social groups, not only from jury pools, but from
juries themselves.5
This Note disputes the interpretation of Taylor that equates jury
impartiality with cross-sectional representation. Such a view of im-
partiality and representation does not square with the full holding of
Taylor, nor is it convincing in light of the way juries reach verdicts.
Rather, the principle of jury representation should be understood to
mean that certain characteristics of society that profoundly affect a
jury's verdict should not be distorted in the jury selection process. The
crucial aspect of the community that must be represented is not sub-
group proportion, but the community's mean verdict impact-the mean
tendency of its members to influence a verdict toward conviction or
acquittal.
Such an understanding of impartiality and representation accounts
for the holding of Taylor. The systematic exclusion of subgroups from
jury venires warps juries' verdict impacts away from the social mean.
Use of the peremptory challenge to remove disproportionate numbers
of social subgroups, however, will distort the mean verdict impact only
1. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed ....
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
2. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
3. Id. at 538.
4. Id.
5. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Com-
monwealth v. Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 170
(1979).
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under certain conditions. Because there currently is no empirical evi-
dence that these conditions actually obtain, the courts are not justified
in assuming such evidence in delimiting the contours of the constitu-
tional requirement of an impartial jury. The decisions limiting use
of the peremptory challenge thus misapply Taylor and misinterpret
the Constitution.
I. The Implications of Taylor v. Louisiana
The rule of Taylor prohibits systematic exclusion of distinctive
groups from jury pools and venires, and thus keeps that stage of the
jury selection process from producing pools that are unrepresentative
of the community.0 Other stages of jury selection, however, can pre-
vent petit juries from resembling the community in subgroup propor-
tions. In particular, the removal of prospective jurors by peremptory
challenge can have this effect. Recent decisions proscribing such
operation of the peremptory rest on a particular view of Taylor as to
the meaning of a representative jury and the relationship between
cross-sectionality and impartiality. An analysis of the problem these
decisions address, then, requires discussion of impartiality through
representation.
A. The Jury Selection Process
The constitutional concern that juries be impartial is reflected in
the complex system that has developed for selecting juries-a series of
steps that narrows the range of potential jurors from the community at
large to groups of twelve or fewer. The process of jury selection,
through various mechanisms, brings into court venires, the groups of
people from which trial juries are drawn.7 The judge or attorneys sub-
ject members of the venire to voir dire examination, a questioning
designed to elicit information about attitudes relevant to jury delibera-
tion and voting.8 Challenges then are used to eliminate prospective
6. 419 U.S. at 538 (pools or venires "must not systematically exclude distinctive groups
in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof").
7. The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 governs selection of federal court
juries. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1976). Selection begins with the compilation of a master
wheel for the district from lists of registered voters. Lists of jurors to be contacted for a
session of court then are drawn at random from the wheel. With the aid of mailed ques-
tionnaires, the eligibility of these prospective jurors is determined and smaller groups are
summoned to court to serve on venires. Cf. UNIFORN JURY SELECTION AND SERvIcE ACT
§§ 5-11 (providing for similar procedure for state courts).
8. The importance of voir dire and the usefulness of the information it elicits was
emphasized in Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973). The voir dire employed by
the trial court in Ham was held to be insufficiently probing on the question of racial
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jurors from the venire and to select the petit jury. The parties exercise
two types of challenges: challenges for cause and peremptory challenges.
The challenge for cause eliminates jurors clearly unable to decide
the case fairly. If the prospective juror fits some common-law category
of persons unlikely to evaluate the case on its merits-for instance, rela-
tives of the accused-the judge will dismiss the individual on challenge
for cause. 9 Similarly, if the challenging attorney convinces the judge
that some other factor, frequently one brought out on voir dire, pre-
cludes impartial factfinding, the challenged individual will be dis-
missed.10 There is no limit to the number of prospective jurors who
may be challenged for cause. Indeed, denial of a well-founded challenge
for cause is a violation of the right to an impartial jury and grounds
for reversal."
The peremptory challenge operates to eliminate prospective jurors
without reference to the judge and without need for explanation.' 2 A
limited number of peremptories are given to each party,' 3 and counsel
prejudice, and the case was reversed and remanded for an improved voir dire. For a
discussion of the importance of voir dire for guiding the peremptory challenge, see Bab-
cock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REv. 545 (1975).
9. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 44 N.C. 330 (1853) (excluding prospective juror because
related to defendant in ninth degree, level proscribed by common law); Churchill v.
Churchill, 12 Vt. 661 (1839) (common law replaced by legislation forbidding jurors related
in fourth degree or closer to party); TEx. CRiM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 35.16(a)1-8, 10
(Vernon Supp. 1980) (codifying common-law categories for automatic challenge for cause).
10. See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 395 F.2d 615, 617-18 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (stating that
challenge for cause would have been granted had it been known at time of murder trial
that juror had had affair strikingly similar to that of victim six months earlier); TEx.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 35.16(a)9 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (disqualifying jurors for actual
bias or prejudice, or for conclusion on guilt or innocence that upon questioning appears
predetermined).
11. See, e.g., State v. West, 200 S.E.2d 859, 864-65 (W. Va. 1973) (refusal to dismiss
juror who was employee of state law enforcement agency held reversible error).
12. The Supreme Court's most extensive discussion of the peremptory challenge was
in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), in which the Court upheld a prosecutor's use
of the peremptory against the claim that it violated the equal protection clause by sys-
tematically excluding blacks from trial juries. According to the Swain Court, "[t]he
essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason
stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control." Id. at 220. This
statement is consistent with other court decisions regarding the nature and use of the
peremptory. See, e.g., State v. Wetmore, 287 N.C. 344, 350-51, 215 S.E.2d 51, 55 (1975)
(peremptories exercised according to party's judgment, without inquiry by court); State
v. Salinas, 87 Wash. 2d 112, 115, 549 P.2d 712, 714 (1976) (peremptory not subject to
court inquiry or control).
13. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (granting each side 20 peremptories in capital
cases, government 6 and defendant 10 for cases in which punishment may exceed one
year, and both sides 3 in other cases; alternative arrangements for multidefendant prose-
cutions). In state cases, the number of peremptories varies. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 655 (West Supp. 1980) (granting each side nine peremptories in first-degree murder
cases, five for other felonies, and three for nonfelonies); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 972.03 (West
1971) (granting each side six peremptories for crimes punishable by life imprisonment,
and four for other crimes).
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may use the peremptory to remove any venire member for any rea-
son.14 The peremptory is employed by each party to eliminate those in-
dividuals most likely to be hostile whose prejudice cannot be proved
to the judge's satisfaction. Extremes of partiality, arising from any
source counsel can discern, are thus removed by the challenge process.
B. The Meaning of Taylor
In Taylor, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment for-
bids the systematic exclusion of distinctive groups in the community
from the pools or venires from which criminal trial juries are chosen. 15
The Louisiana jury selection system challenged in that case had ef-
fectively excluded women from juries. 6 In reversing Taylor's convic-
tion for aggravated kidnapping, the Court held the state's method to
be constitutionally defective.
Distinctive groups may not be excluded in jury pool selection, the
Court reasoned, because the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury includes the right to have on pools a "representative cross section
of the community."' 7 Unless such a cross section is present, the jury
will fail to represent the judicial authority of the people.18 Taylor was
an important innovation because it rested on the Sixth Amendment
jury trial right 9 and not on the Fourteenth Amendment's equal pro-
14. Recent California and Massachusetts cases now limit the use of the peremptory
challenge. See p. 1183 infra.
15. 419 U.S. at 538.
16. Prior to Taylor, the Louisiana Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure pro-
vided that women could not be summoned for jury service unless they affirmatively
volunteered. Id. at 523 nn.1 9: 2. Men were taken without volunteering. Id. at 524-25.
The venire of 175 persons in Taylor's case included no women. Id. at 525.
17. Id. at 528 ("the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the
community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial").
18. Id. at 527. The Court recently restated the Taylor rule when it struck down
Missouri's jury selection system, which granted, upon request, an automatic exemption
from jury service only to women. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). Duren explained
that a prima facie case of a violation of Taylor is made by showing:
(I) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community;
(2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is
not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;
and
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the
jury-selection process.
439 U.S. at 364.
19. 419 U.S. at 528. Cases prior to Taylor suggested or mentioned the cross-section
standard without holding that it was a Sixth Amendment right. For instance, in Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), the Court reversed a conviction by a jury from
which blacks had been excluded, holding that the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment forbade such discrimination. Id. at 307-08. In Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475 (1954), the protection of Strauder was extended to Mexican Americans, as the
Court held that "[tlhe exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury service solely
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tection clause.2 0 The doctrinal and practical importance of the shift
from the Fourteenth to the Sixth Amendment is considerable, for it
generated new protections for groups in the jury selection process.21
Despite the clarity of its holding, Taylor leaves uncertain the theory
of representation on which it rests and which it seeks to implement.
Typically, an impartial juror is defined as one who will decide a case
because of their ancestry or national origin is discrimination prohibited by the Four-
teenth Amendment." Id. at 479. Likewise, in Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187
(1946), the Court forbade the systematic and intentional exclusion of women from federal
juries in states in which women were eligible for jury service, as part of its function of
supervising the federal courts. In Ballard, the court appealed to the principle of cross-
sectionality as a congressional policy and not as a Sixth Amendment mandate. Id. at 191.
In Taylor, the Court recognized that it previously had suggested cross-sectionality as part
of the Sixth Amendment without holding it to be so, stating that its inquiry was "whether
the presence of a fair cross section of the community on venires, panels, or lists from
which petit juries are drawn is essential to the fulfillment of the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of an impartial jury trial in criminal prosecutions." 419 U.S. at 526. If the
Court had answered that question conclusively in its prior cases, Taylor would not have
been necessary.
20. Cf. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) (upholding right of prospective
jurors under Fourteenth Amendment not to be discriminated against); Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 (1953) (racial discrimination in jury selection forbidden by Fourteenth
Amendment); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (same).
21. Different and broader protections, as well as lighter burdens of proof, prevail
under the Sixth Amendment or a state jury trial guarantee, see note 30 infra, than under
the Fourteenth Amendment. This change is pronounced if Taylor is applied to the
peremptory as some state courts suggest. Under Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965),
only a consistent pattern of exclusion of a protected group from the jury with the
peremptory can prove a violation of the equal protection clause, because only in this
manner can the presumption that the prosecutor is using the peremptory to remove
hostile jurors be overcome. If the prosecutor uses the peremptory for reasons related to
the trial, no violation occurs at all, even if blacks are disproportionately challenged. See
United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 908 (1977) (writ of
mandamus to district judge issued to prevent his inquiry into prosecutorial motives in
exercise of peremptory challenge against blacks; prosecutor's challenge not act of in-
vidious discrimination when based on judgment as to factors that may influence jurors'
verdict); State v. Kelly, 362 So. 2d 1071, 1076-77 (La. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1118 (1979)
(state's use of 10 of 12 peremptories to remove blacks upheld because no showing of his-
torical pattern; claim that Taylor impliedly modified Swain rejected). The Swain hurdle
is a very high one in terms of both the definition of the offense and evidentiary require-
ments.
By contrast, a rule based on the Sixth Amendment or a parallel state jury trial right is
of much broader application. Under the rule of Wheeler and Soares, misuse of the
peremptory by one prosecutor in one case can be grounds for reversal. Further, it is not a
defense under the Sixth Amendment to say that minority persons were challenged because
of their probable views on the case. Rather, such use of the peremptory to exclude un-
favorable jurors, privileged under Swain, is the very definition of the offense in Wheeler
and Soares as long as the prosecutor's judgment as to juror predisposition is based
primarily on subgroup membership. A prosecutor might violate Wheeler frequently
without ever violating the rule of Swain at all, if he always used the peremptory for
reasons related to the outcome of the case. Furthermore, only a prosecutor can violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, because only state action is bound under equal protection
strictures. Either side can violate Wheeler. Finally, the jury trial right protects all "dis-
tinctive groups," including women, while the coverage of the Fourteenth Amendment is
more limited. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1063-70 (1978).
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only on the basis of the facts the law deems relevant and not on ex-
traneous factors.2 2 An impartial juror is one free from bias, and bias is
usually defined as a tendency to judge on the basis of something other
than the legally relevant facts.23 Selecting an impartial jury can thus
be viewed simply as a matter of eliminating those who are biased and
hence unable to adjudicate the case fairly. The challenge for cause is
the constitutionally mandated method for eliminating such biased
jurors, those who will consider irrelevant factors in reaching their
verdict.2 4 Any jury that has been subjected to the challenge for cause,
then, should be composed of impartial jurors and thus, by definition,
be impartial.
This traditional understanding of impartiality and bias does not
explain Taylor, however, for the case had nothing to do with challenges
for cause. No claim was raised that members of the petit jury that con-
victed Taylor were prejudiced and should have been removed. Rather,
the Louisiana system was held not to produce impartial juries because
it systematically excluded women from venires. Thus, the selection of
impartial juries must involve something more than the simple elimina-
tion of "bias."
Taylor does not delineate the additional requirements of impar-
tiality;25 it simply demands that juries in some way represent the com-
22. See, e.g., Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 302 (1977) (quoting Murphy v. Florida,
421 U.S. 794, 799-800 (1975)) (calling impartial juror one who will "'render a verdict
based on the evidence presented in court' "); Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)
(defining the "indifferent" juror as one whose "verdict must be based upon the evidence
developed at the trial").
23. In State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977), for example, the Utah Supreme Court
reversed a conviction because the trial judge failed to accept a challenge to two biased
jurors. The jurors were friends of prosecution witnesses, and the court reasoned that this
would render them unable to adjudge the evidence at trial fairly. They were biased be-
cause their weighing of the evidence would be influenced by an extraneous factor. Id.
at 801-02.
24. Although the challenge for cause is constitutionally required, see, e.g., State v.
Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 801-02 (Utah 1977) (failure to grant well-grounded challenge for
cause is ground for reversal), the peremptory challenge, the only other tool for removing
bias, is not, see Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919). If impartiality is simply
a matter of removing bias, the challenge for cause is sufficient to attain it.
25. Although Taylor rests on the impartiality requirement, 419 U.S. at 525, the
decision's discussion of impartiality is so obscure that its reliance on that requirement
has been subject to attack. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S.
357 (1979), accused the majority of duplicity in claiming to derive the Taylor rule from
impartiality, or even from the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 370-74 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Rehnquist argued that the Court was passing off equal protection holdings as rulings
on impartiality, and asserted that if the Court really meant what it said about cross sec-
tions it would extend its ruling to forbid unrepresentative juries as well. Id. at 371-73,
n.*. Justice Rehnquist's argument proceeds from the same premise as Wheeler and Soares,
that the purpose of cross-sectional pools is to provide cross-sectional juries. This Note
argues that such a premise is unfounded.
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munity. The decision makes clear, however, that representation does
not entail racial, sexual, or other cross-sectionality in petit juries. The
Court in Taylor announced that it would "impose no requirement that
petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the
various distinctive groups in the population." 26
Nonetheless, Taylor could be extended to make juries more cross-
sectional without requiring quotas. In particular, if a party applies its
peremptory challenges disproportionately to members of some sub-
group, the peremptory can produce a jury with group proportions that
differ substantially from those of the population.2 7 Faced with such
situations, the Supreme Courts of California and Massachusetts recently
proscribed this use of the peremptory as violative of the requirement
of impartiality. Those courts in People v. Wheeler28 and Common-
wealth v. Soares29 followed what they perceived to be the definition of
representativeness suggested by Taylor. The courts read their respective
state jury trial guarantees 30 to prohibit the use of the peremptory chal-
26. 419 U.S. at 538 (citing Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284 (1947) and Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972) (plurality opinion of White, J.)).
27. Commentators have argued that this use of the peremptory violates the Sixth
Amendment and Taylor. See, e.g., Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representa-
tion of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Peremptory
Challenge) (resting squarely on Taylor for argument that peremptory must not be allowed
to cause "unrepresentative" and hence partial juries). This argument that the Sixth
Amendment impartiality requirement requires control of the peremptory was recently
approved in an article lauding Soares and Wheeler. See Brown, McGuire, & Winters, The
Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use Or
Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REv. 192, 228-34 (1978). But see Note, The Defendant's Right to
Object to Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1770
(1979) (approving outcome in Wheeler and Soares, not on the basis of Taylor, the cross-
section requirement, or impartiality, but on other values in Sixth Amendment). For a
general treatment of the meaning of Taylor, see Daughtrey, Cross Sectionalism in Jury-
Selection Procedures After Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REv. 1 (1975).
This use of the peremptory also has been attacked for violating the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Comment, The Prosecutor's Exercise of the
Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Nonwhite Jurors: A Valued Common Law Privilege In
Conflict With the Equal Protection Clause, 46 U. CIN. L. Rav. 554 (1977); Comment, A
Case Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal Protection and Due
Process, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 662 (1974).
Similarly, it has been argued that the "representativeness" requirement also mandates
that voter lists be supplemented when they are "unrepresentative." See Kairys, Kadane, &
Lehoczky, Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists, 65 CALIF. L. REv.
776 (1977). For a discussion of the constitutional implications of unrepresentativeness at
various stages of jury selection, see J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELEcTION PROCEDURES (1977).
28. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
29. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 170 (1979).
30. The California and Massachusetts decisions rest on state jury trial guarantees and
not directly on the Sixth Amendment. Both Wheeler and Soares, however, interpret their
state constitutions as mandating impartiality and then use Taylor to explicate that man-
date. The right to trial by jury is "inviolate" according to CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 16.
Wheeler notes that this includes the requirement that juries be impartial and charac-
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lenge systematically to remove members of subgroups from petit
juries.31
II. Representation and Impartiality
Taylor holds that to be impartial juries must represent the com-
munity. Proportional subgroup cross-sectionality does not accomplish
this representation, however, and should not be seen as the goal of
Taylor. Rather, under the Sixth Amendment, juries should represent
the community in one characteristic and one characteristic only: the
mean impact of the jurors on the jury's verdict. In order to ensure the
requisite impartiality, the jury should not systematically differ from
the mean tendency of the members of the community to influence the
verdict one way or another. This understanding of representation best
accounts for the holding of Taylor.
A. The Failure of Literal Cross-Sectionality
At the outset, any simplistic interpretation of the representation re-
quirement must be rejected: impartiality cannot mean that the jury
should even tend to be a mirror of the subgroup proportions of the
community. 32 Not only would this interpretation violate clear language
terizes Taylor and its antecedents as standing for the proposition that impartiality is best
achieved by encouraging the representation of a variety of groups on trial juries. 22 Cal.
3d at 266-67, 583 P.2d at 754-55, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895-96. According to Soares, similar
protection of the jury trial is provided in Massachusetts under MAss. CONST. Pt. 1, art.
XIL 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 608, 387 N.E.2d at 508. Soares draws on Taylor, 1979 Mass.
Adv. Sh. at 615-16, 387 N.E.2d at 511-12; see Comment, People v. Wheeler: Peremptory
Challenges-A New Interpretation, 14 NEw ENG. L. Rav. 370, 389 (1970) (uncritical ex-
position of Wheeler, characterizing it as "logical extension" of Taylor); 44 Mo. L. REv.
559 (1979) (report of Wheeler without comment); Note, People v. Wheeler, 58 N.C.L.
REv. 152 (1979) (praising Wheeler but worrying that case creates uncertainties and may
reduce value of peremptory to defense); 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 599 (1979) (characterizing
Wheeler's holding as fully in accord with purpose of peremptory).
31. Wheeler concluded that "the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective
jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from
a representative cross-section of the community." 22 CAL. 3d at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. The rule of Soares is that "exercise of peremptory challenges to
exclude members of discrete groups, solely on the basis of bias presumed to derive from
that individual's membership in the group, contravenes the requirement inherent in art.
12 of the Declaration of Rights." 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 627, 387 N.E.2d at 516.
32. The California and Massachusetts courts seemed to understand that the rule
derived by Taylor from the impartiality requirement mandates some approximation of
cross-sectionality in petit juries. Wheeler reasoned that the purpose of Taylor's rule about
jury pools and venires was "to achieve an overall impartiality by allowing the interaction
of the diverse beliefs and values the jurors bring from their group experience." 22 Cal.
3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902. Similarly, the Soares court thought the
cross-section rule applied directly to the petit jury itself and that it was not enough for the
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in Taylor,3 3 it also would fail to account for the rejection of Sixth
Amendment claims when all the defendant demonstrated was that some
group was unrepresented on the jury that convicted him.34 The only
way in which one could reconcile the current cases with a requirement
of literal representativeness would be to acknowledge that no single jury
could ever fully represent every subgroup in the population.1z Yet even
this tack must fail, for if a literal concept of representativeness were
to have any meaning, the defendant, at a minimum, would be entitled
to a jury from some range of adequately cross-sectional panels. Such,
however, is not the case: a demographically unrepresentative jury con-
stitutionally may convict a defendant. 30
On the other hand, Taylor cannot be interpreted simply to prohibit
jury selection procedures that systematically produce unrepresentative
juries. It is not sufficient to guarantee a defendant that he will receive,
if not a cross section on his jury, at least a system not rigged to deny
him one.37 If the defendant has a constitutional interest in a cross-
venire to be representative: "The desired interaction of a cross-section of the community
does not occur there; it is only effectuated within the jury room itself." 1979 Mass. Adv.
Sh. at 620, 387 N.E.2d at 513. Literal cross-sectionality in trial juries is the goal of Wheeler
and Soares.
33. 419 U.S. at 538 (no requirement that individual juries be demographically repre-
sentative).
34. Such cases demonstrate that the refusal in Taylor to mandate representativeness
in the literal sense is more than just dictum. Unrepresentative juries are allowed to
convict. See, e.g., United States v. Turcotte, 558 F.2d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1977) (lack of
American Indians on petit jury no violation because no right to proportionate repre-
sentation of groups); United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977) (all-white jury acceptable although three blacks removed with
peremptory; no right to proportional representation); Jeffers v. United States, 451 F. Supp.
1338, 1347 (N.D. Ind. 1978) (no violation in lack of blacks on petit jury). Taylor is some-
times cited in support of this outcome. See, e.g., United States v. D'Alora, 585 F.2d 16, 22
(1st Cir. 1978) (challenge to jury containing no minorities rejected; no requirement that
jury mirror community); Stewart v. Ricketts, 451 F. Supp. 911, 917 (M.D. Ga. 1978)
(habeus corpus challenge to jury with no blacks rejected). This interpretation of the
federal Constitution is also adhered to by the states. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 118 Ariz.
76, 80, 574 P.2d 1295, 1299, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 846 (1978) (first-degree murder convic-
tion by all-white jury, in itself, not error); State v. Stewart, 225 Kan. 410, 417, 591 P.2d
166, 172 (1979) (all-white jury produced by peremptory acceptable; People v. Wheeler
specifically rejected).
35. Soares makes the point that "no jury of reasonable size could possibly reflect all
the distinctive groups in the community." 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 619, 387 N.E.2d at 512.
36. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (no requirement individual juries be
demographically representative). If a thoroughly unrepresentative jury-in a demographic
sense-is constitutionally permissible, then it is uncertain what constraints the representa-
tiveness requirement actually imposes.
37. Wheeler seems to argue that so long as unrepresentative juries are produced un-
systematically-i.e., by chance-they are unavoidable and hence acceptable. The rule of
Wheeler gives random selection, and its unsystematic effects, a special status; the de-
fendant is entitled to "a petit jury that is as near an approximation of the ideal cross-
section of the community as the process of random draw permits." 22 Cal. 3d at 277, 583
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sectional jury, the fact that he was not deprived of it systematically
should be irrelevant. He still would be harmed by the operation of
the jury selection system. Random chance, which would cause some
unrepresentativeness even in a system that generally produced repre-
sentative juries, has no special status that would permit deprivations of
cross-sectionality if that was otherwise required.38 Chance is not a
necessary element in jury selection, and providing a defendant with
the possibility of a cross section is not the best the State can do. The
requirement of the Sixth Amendment is unequivocal and if a jury
must be cross-sectional to be impartial then it must be cross-sectional
in every case.
These interpretations of Taylor-that it requires literal representa-
tiveness on each jury, or that it only proscribes systematic denials of a
cross-sectional jury-simply are untenable as reasons for controlling the
use of the peremptory challenge on subgroups. Not only is the concept
of representation implicit in these interpretations unfounded in Taylor
or other case law, the concept is based on an unpersuasive theory of the
relationship between impartiality and cross-sectional representativeness.
It has been argued that impartiality requires a cross section of the
community on the jury because an impartial jury is the result of mixing
a variety of attitudes and insights and that these insights are specially
connected to subgroup membership; 9 the claim is that if certain sub-
groups are not represented on the jury, their point of view will not have
been heard and the jury will not be impartial. This "group bias" 40
argument is not persuasive. The attitudes of jurors that influence
verdicts are not necessarily associated with subgroup membership. 41
P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. Soares quotes this passage. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 627,
387 N.E.2d at 516. Neither opinion explains why the convenience of random selection
prevails against the constitutional requirement of representativeness, even though Wheeler
admits that chance predictably will result in some wholly unrepresentative juries. 22 Cal.
3d at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
38. There is no constitutional requirement that jury selection be random as long as
the jury is impartial. See United States v. Hawkins, 566 F.2d 1006, 1012 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 848 (1978) (randomness a statutory, not constitutional, requirement).
39. Both Wheeler and Soares subscribe to the notion that impartiality is to be achieved
by mixing a variety of views on the jury itself, and that these views are associated with
subgroup membership. See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 266-67, 583 P.2d at 754-55, 148 Cal. Rptr.
896; Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 617-21, 387 N.E.2d at 512-13.
40. Wheeler and Soares denominate the attitudes associated with group membership as
"group bias" and prohibit the use of the peremptory to exclude prospective jurors because
of those attitudes. See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 274-77, 583 P.2d at 760-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
901-03; Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 626, 387 N.E.2d at 515-16.
41. Factors other than subgroup membership also are important in determining ver-
dicts. The jury selection in the trial of H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman and John
Mitchell brought out this importance. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir.
1976). The Court of Appeals lauded the trial court's use of voir dire to eliminate juror
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Even when they are, the importance of subgroup-associated viewpoints
varies from case to case.42 Moreover, the claim that subgroup member-
ship is uniquely related to some attitude or verdict input is unsup-
ported.4 3 Any number of jury characteristics can affect both the juror's
judgment and the influence he has on the jury.
A more sophisticated argument for representing subgroups on petit
juries is similarly flawed. This view distinguishes between situation-
specific bias-a juror attitude related to the particular facts of a case-
and non-situation-specific bias-an attitude operating across a wide
range of cases. The claim is that the community's non-situation-specific
biases must be represented on the jury and that such biases are espe-
cially related to subgToup membership. 44
The argument that jurors should be eliminated only on the basis of
situation-specific attitudes is not tenable, however. A prospective juror
who will vote to convict anyone of anything has a bias that is not
specific to the facts of any one situation, but he is also the prototypical
biased juror, and the defendant is seriously disadvantaged by his pres-
ence on the jury. Non-situation-specific bias is just another form of
bias: voir dire inquiry included juror employment, attitudes toward defendants, political
activities, views on witness credibility, and exposure to publicity. Id. at 65-66. Similarly, one
guidebook for defense attorneys suggests inquiry into connection with law enforcement
agencies, volunteer work, military service, and experience with the crime charged. A.
GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 374-79 (1975).
42. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976), demonstrates that the impact of subgroup-
associated attitudes will vary. In Ross, the defendant was black and the victim white.
Defense counsel demanded that the judge's voir dire go directly to the question of racial
prejudice. The Ross Court held, however, that the "generalized but thorough inquiry
into the impartiality of the veniremen" was sufficient, distinguishing Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973), in which the Court had demanded that voir dire explicitly
include the issue of racial bias. Race was more important in Ham than in Ross, the Court
reasoned, because in Ham the defendant claimed that he had been framed because of
civil rights activities. The races of the defendant and victim in Ross, by contrast, were
unrelated to the facts of the case. The impact of racially associated attitudes thus differed
even in two cases in which they may well have been operative. In other instances they
would have no relevance at all to the jury's verdict.
43. Bias unrelated to subgroup affiliation can be more important than that related
to group membership. In Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976), discussed in note 42 supra,
racial bias was not sufficiently important to require direct treatment on voir dire. A
juror's blood relationship to the defendant, for instance, would have been considerably
more important. Indeed, the argument that jurors of different races cannot represent one
another-cannot have the same influence on a verdict-proves too much. Although it may
be the case that two individuals of different subgroups would not have the same effect on
the deliberations of a jury, no two individuals would ever have exactly the same influence
on a jury, for no two individuals are exactly alike. Subgroup membership is no different
from any number of characteristics that distinguish people from one another. The im-
partiality requirement thus provides no basis for granting group characteristics a privileged
status.
44. See Peremptory Challenge, supra note 27, at 1718-19, 1726-32 (arguing that repre-
sentation of subgroups on juries furthers impartiality for this reason).
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juror attitude and should not be entitled to special treatment. Even
if certain non-situation-specific biases are deemed desirable, their
presence cannot be ensured by protecting subgroups. 45 Moreover, sub-
group membership may correlate with situation-specific biases,40 which
presumably are disfavored. The representation of subgroups thus will
protect many situation-specific biases and fail to protect many non-
situation-specific biases. In any event, such representation will not
further impartiality.
B. The Meaning of Jury Representation
Although extension of Taylor to require that a jury mirror the com-
munity demographically is inappropriate, that decision's emphasis on
representation as an aspect of impartiality is critical. As an initial
matter, it is not obvious that a jury should be representative at all.
Democracy requires that citizens be the ultimate decisionmakers on
questions of policy-questions .of what the law should be. Such deci-
sions are reached through the political process, and for its legitimacy,
that process must represent the people. Juries, however, do not decide
what the law should be; they decide facts. Their role is the technical
one of applying the law and not making it. Once the people have
decided political issues through the legislative process, it might seem
that the need to represent the citizenry has been satisfied.
The use of juries, however, assumes that lay people are uniquely
competent, not only to make the law, but also to apply it.47 If these
people did not possess this second competence, the jury system would
irrationally substitute the untrained insights of juries for the pro-
fessional expertise of judges.4s Given this special competence, how-
ever, ordinary citizens are called on to judge guilt and innocence
using the decision methods, not of politics, but of judicial fact-
finding. Because the confidence that justifies the jury system is in
the people as a whole, juries should continue to represent the citi-
zenry even though they make different kinds of decisions and employ
different methods than lawmakers.
45. For example, an anarchist might always vote to acquit the defendant. Not all
anarchists belong to a protected subgroup, however, nor do anarchists-who are united
by a non-situation-specific bias-constitute such a group.
46. For example, a male's inability to convict accused rapists could have much to do
with his being male, but this might have no effect on his judgment in a robbery case.
47. Taylor states that the purpose of the jury is to make available the "commonsense
judgment of the community" in deciding cases. 419 U.S. at 530.
48. Id. (community judgment preferred to "overzealous or mistaken prosecutor" and
"overconditioned or biased response of a judge").
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This interest in representation through juries is part of the constitu-
tional requirement of impartiality. Traditionally, bias has been con-
sidered a trait the juror either has or has not. However, judicial rea-
soning on impartiality sometimes refers to bias as a matter of degree
rather than as a discrete characteristic. 49 It is also frequently noted that
the significance of juror bias rests in the way in which it influences
verdicts."
This viewpoint, seeming to treat bias as a generalized trend of
thought rather than as a simple discrete characteristic, suggests a more
sophisticated concept of impartiality. Although it is difficult to describe
the full range of factors that influence how a juror will deliberate and
vote-certainly the task is not accomplished by saying that he is or is
not biased 5l-the characteristics that all jurors have that influence ver-
dicts can be summarized on a single, continuous scale that measures
each juror's "verdict impact" for a given venire and a given case.
The significance of individual jurors' verdict impacts is reflected in
the conduct of trial attorneys. These attorneys intuitively rely on a
concept of verdict impact to remove those veniremen most likely to
have an unfavorable impact on the verdict-those most hostile to the
challenging side.5 2 In order to use the peremptory, attorneys must rank
prospective jurors on a single scale. For any case and any venire, an
attorney could in theory be asked to estimate the probability that a
jury would convict knowing only that it contained a particular juror.
The attorney would be estimating that juror's verdict impact-the in-
49. The Court in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), described the function
of the peremptory as the elimination from both sides of extremes of partiality. Because
extremes only exist in matters of degree, the Court was implicitly referring to the loca-
tion of jurors on some continuous scale.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1979) (trial judge
erred in ruling that juror clearly biased against defendants could not have influenced
jury verdict); United States v. Bowles, 574 F.2d 970, 971-73 (8th Cir. 1978) (trial court
erred in failing to determine whether prospective jurors' verdict would be influenced by
racial bias); State v. Taylor, 282 So. 2d 491, 502 (La. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub
norn. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (challenge for cause to remove prospective
juror whose relationship with victim "would influence him in arriving at a verdict and
thus cause him to be biased against the defendant").
51. "Bias" is sometimes used as a generic term for any attitude that may influence
the verdict, rather than being limited to those attitudes so unacceptable as to trigger the
challenge for cause. This is illustrated by the use of "group bias" in Wheeler and
Soares. See note 40 supra. That sort of bias does not warrant removal, according to those
opinions; rather, it warrants inclusion.
52. For an empirical study of the information relied on by prosecutors in exercising
the peremptory, based on information requested by actual prosecutors given hypothetical
cases in experiment, see Hayden, Senna, & Siegel, Prosecutorial Discretion In Peremptory
Challenges: An Empirical Investigation of Information Use In the Massachussets Jury
Selection Process, 13 NEw ENG. L. Rav. 768 (1978).
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fluence he would have on the jury's verdict as a result of the innumer-
able traits ordinary people bring into the jury box. Verdict impact
would be defined on a scale from zero to one. Each individual would
have a verdict impact, and the mean of the verdict impacts of the jurors
would correlate with the verdict tendency of the jury as a whole. Juries
with higher mean verdict impacts would tend to convict more fre-
quently than those with low means. 53
The relationship of verdict impact to impartiality is clear: a jury
will be impartial-that is, able to reach a verdict fairly and accurately-
only if its mean verdict impact is not dissimilar to the mean verdict
impact of society as a whole. This is so because juries are empowered
to decide cases precisely because they represent the innumerable traits
and insights of the people-because ordinary individuals are thought to
be good fact-finders. The measure summarizing those traits is the ver-
dict impact, and the social mean verdict impact summarizes them for
the entire populace.54 The impartial jury, then, is to be measured, not
only by the simple standard proscribing explicit bias, but also by the
social mean verdict impact.5
53. Although strong, this correlation will not be perfect. The requirement that jurors
deliberate assumes it is possible, for example, for a single juror with a high verdict
impact to convince the rest to convict even though they have low verdict impacts. In
general, however, verdict impact by definition relates to the likeliness of a jury to convict.
54. Taylor assumed that there is more than mere membership in the population in-
volved in representing the citizenry, since it reversed a conviction by an all-lay panel.
That additional factor of representation is the relation between the jury's mean and the
social mean.
55. The peremptory challenge is also part of this scheme of impartiality. Indeed, only
in the context of a single, continuous characteristic that all jurors have and that im-
portantly conditions verdicts is the peremptory explicable at all; the traditional notion
of bias does not account for the peremptory challenge. The challenge for cause removes
potential jurors whose bias is a discrete characteristic-they are either biased or not, and
if they are biased they may not serve as jurors. See pp. 1181-82 supra. This is all the
Constitution requires, and it seems to leave no place for the peremptory; a properly
functioning challenge for cause will remove all bias. If the challenge for cause fails in
any particular case, the remedy need only concern that case; it would not be necessary to
institute an additional peremptory challenge system.
The peremptory, then, does not operate on bias in the traditional sense, and it is in-
accurate to characterize it as doing so, even though such a characterization is common.
See, e.g., State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55, 62, 402 A.2d 203, 206 (1979) (purpose of peremp-
tory to make trier of fact as nearly impartial as possible by removing bias); Staiger v.
Gaarder, 258 N.W.2d 641, 645 (N.D. 1977) (peremptory intended to remove jurors who
would not be impartial).
Instead, the peremptory removes the extremes of verdict impact from both sides. This
reduction of the "spread" of verdict impact could reduce the danger that the deliberative
mechanism will magnify extreme views that might be presented forcefully in the jury
room, and also could prevent the unanimity rule from exaggerating the influence of such
extreme positions. It also could facilitate deliberation by making the jury less polarized.
Finally, the peremptory, by removing extremes, will'serve to dampen the effects of random
selection on the jury's mean verdict impact as compared to society's.
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It would be impossible, of course, to reproduce the social mean on
any single jury. Determining either the social mean or a jury's mean
would be a prodigious task, and doing so confidently in countless cases
would not be feasible. Nevertheless, certain jury selection methods
would predictably distort the means of the juries they choose, even
though that distortion is not measurable in any one case. In Taylor,
the Court confronted just such a system. The Louisiana jury selection
system tended to eliminate women, and the Supreme Court found that
women as a group have a mean verdict impact for many cases that
differs significantly from society's.56 Hence, the mean of all-male juries
would differ systematically from the social mean, and juries so selected
would not represent the community.57 The rule of Taylor-that dis-
tinctive groups may not systematically be kept off venires5s-thus
follows directly from the need to prevent systematic deviation of the
jury's mean verdict impact 59 from society's.
III. Representation and the Peremptory Challenge
The representation component of impartiality is preserved by pre-
venting systematic jury deviation from the social mean verdict impact.
This view of impartiality accounts for the holding of Taylor that
distinctive groups in the community may not be excluded systemat-
56. This is the point of Taylor's claim that a distinct "flavor" is lost in jury delib-
cration if either sex is excluded. 419 U.S. at 531-32. Of course, the Court did not find
that this "flavor" is essential to impartiality in every case. 419 U.S. at 538.
57. It is in this sense that men and women are not "fungible," as Taylor puts it. 419
U.S. at 531. A pool composed wholly of men differs in mean verdict impact from one
containing both sexes. As groups they are not fungible; as individuals, they may be-a man
and a woman could have the same verdict impact.
58. In implementing the rule of Taylor, lower courts identify "distinctive groups"
with criteria that indicate a mean verdict impact different from society's. See, e.g., United
States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 591 (10th Cir. 1976) (distinctive group has cohesiveness of
attitudes that sets members off from social milieu).
59. The characteristic of the community that may not be distorted need not be con-
ceptualized in exactly this fashion. Instead of verdict impact as here defined, it is natural
to look at jurors in terms of their judgment on guilt prior to deliberation, their in-
dividual proneness to convict, without reference to their influence on and from delibera-
tion. Although the use of conviction proneness as the privileged community characteristic
would not change the analysis of this Note, verdict impact is used because of its closer
connection to empirical reality. Attorneys especially are concerned primarily with verdict
impact, insofar as they can estimate it, and they are concerned with individual proneness
to convict as a factor in verdict impact. Verdict impact has the added advantage of making
it possible to take into account the unique rule of unanimity that frequently applies to
jury verdicts; part of the calculation going into an individual's verdict impact is the
likelihood that he will, by himself, prevent an adverse verdict through the unanimity
requirement.
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ically from venires. It also explains why Taylor refused to extend this
rule to petit juries. Because the effect of excluding individuals from
a jury by either random chance or the peremptory differs from that
of excluding the same individuals from jury pools or venires, juries
themselves do not have to be representative of the community in sub-
group proportions.
The effect of the peremptory on the mean verdict impact of the jury
depends on the distribution of verdict impact in the community. For
some distributions, the normal operation of the peremptory will dis-
tort the jury's mean from that of the community. For other distribu-
tions, however, the peremptory will produce no such distortion; in
these cases, limitation of the peremptory would distort "the jury's mean
from the community's. Wheeler and Soares did not rest on evidence
about which distribution existed in the community in question, nor
is such evidence now available. Thus, the conclusions in those decisions
that the uncorltrolled use of the peremptory caused juries to be un-
representative of the community was unwarranted, and limitation of
peremptory challenges in order to protect subgroups on the petit jury
was not sound.
A. The Effect of the Peremptory
Chance operates to eliminate many potential jurors in the steps from
venires to the petit jury, but it does not do so in the fashion found
unacceptable in Taylor. Chance has no systematic effect either on sub-
group proportions or on the petit jury's verdict impact. All individuals
are equally likely to be eliminated randomly. Because chance does not
have a systematic effect on mean verdict impact, Taylor rightly refused
to control its effects on petit jury composition.
The effects of eliminating an individual from a jury by the peremp-
tory are also sufficiently unlike those of eliminating the same individual
by exclusion from the jury pool that the simple rationale of Taylor
does not apply. A venire member who is challenged peremptorily still
has some effect on the mean verdict impact of the jury simply by being
on the venire, and hence is unlike an individual who is eliminated prior
to that point. For example, if the formerly excluded women who are
added to the jury venire after Taylor have a conviction impact higher
than any other venire members, they will be challenged by the defense
in place of the next least conviction-promoting venire members, who
otherwise would have been removed. Thus, the mean conviction im-
pact of the jury will rise, even though the newly included women are
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removed by the peremptory. Because the verdict impact of individuals
and groups affects petit juries even if they are eliminated by the
peremptory, the systematic deviation from the social mean found in
Taylor does not result.
B. Attitude Distributions and the Impact of the Peremptory
The rationale of Taylor does not mandate limitation of the peremp-
tory challenge, nor, of course, do arguments linking impartiality to
literal notions of representativeness. If Wheeler and Soares are not
interpreted to rest on a demographic notion of representativeness, then
they must be interpreted to rely on empirical premises concerning
the distribution of verdict impact in the population that were not
found in Taylor. Neither Wheeler nor Soares established this em-
pirical claim, however, and they scarcely could have, for the subject
is discussed tangentially at best in the current literature.60
Any distortion caused by the peremptory of the jury's mean verdict
impact from that of society depends on the social distribution of verdict
impact.01 Suppose that the social distribution, correctly reproduced on
the venire,0 2 is asymmetrical about the mean-that the extremes in
favor of acquittal are farther away from the mean than the extremes in
favor of conviction.6 3 Suppose further that the acquittal extreme is
60. Empirical studies relating to juries generally address other subjects. See, e.g.,
Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qualified
Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1 (1970) (arguing
that exclusion of "scrupled" jurors renders jury more conviction-prone and less repre-
sentative); Suggs & Sales, Using Communication Cues to Evaluate Prospective Jurors
During the Voir Dire, 20 ARiz. L. REV. 629 (1978) (experiments and use of psychological
methods to estimate juror suitability); note 68 infra (citing sources).
61. This entire discussion rests on the assumption that both sides are equally able to
identify hostile jurors. For evidence indicating that this ability is still very limited in
many circumstances, see Zeisel & Diamond, The Effects of Peremptory Challenge on Jury
and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REv. 491 (1978). It
might be suggested that the point of Wheeler and Soares is to mitigate such an im-
balance. There was no showing, however, that one exists or that it is especially pronounced
in situations in which members of minority groups are subject to disproportionate
challenge. In any event, the logical remedy for an informational imbalance would be to
grant additional challenges to the disadvantaged side as a matter of general policy, rather
than to accomplish the same effect for fortuitously chosen venires in which members of
subgroups seem to cluster at one end.
62. Systematic distortion of the venire's mean is prevented by the rule of Taylor, and
only chance would operate to alter its distribution from that of the total social pool from
which it is drawn. When chance does so, the effect of the peremptory becomes un-
predictable.
63. Such a pattern could be charted on a graph, as in Figure 1:
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occupied by members of some subgroup. In this case, the normal opera-
tion of the peremptory64 will have a disproportionate impact on mem-
bers of that subgToup. More importantly, it will distort the jury's mean
in favor of conviction, because the prosecution's removal of subgToup




0 verdict impact 1
acquittal conviction
asymmetric with subgroup at one extreme
For a similar graph designed around a completely different assumption as to the purpose
of the peremptory challenge, see Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 61, at 527 (assuming pur-
pose of peremptory to eliminate certain degree of bias no matter what community distribu-
tion is).
64. The statutory peremptory does not always operate with numerical symmetry: in
some jurisdictions, for some cases the defense receives more peremptories than does the
prosecution. E.g., ALASKA RuLEs CRIm. P. 24(d) (granting state six and defendant 10
peremptories when offense is punishable by more than one-year imprisonment); S.C.
CODE § 14-7-1110 (1976) (granting state five and defendant 10 peremptories in trials
for murder, manslaughter, burglary, arson, rape, grand larceny, breach of trust, per-
jury, or forgery). It might appear from this that the peremptory is permitted to change
the social mean verdict impact when the legislature specifically decides that it should
do so. Such a legislative power to determine the community judgment also underlies the
authority to prescribe a "death-qualified" jury in cases involving capital punishment,
where prospective jurors whose attitudes would prevent them from ever imposing the
death penalty are challenged for cause under a specific legislative mandate. E.g., MONT.
REv. CODES ANN. § 46-16-304(h) (1979). The Court has approved this legislative definition
of the community judgment. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 513-14 (1968)
(elimination of those opposed to death penalty prohibited; elimination of those unwilling
ever to impose death penalty approved). It has never questioned the asymmetrical grant
of peremptory challenges. No such exercise of legislative authority, however, justifies




nation of pro-conviction jurors. In this case, limiting the peremptory's
disproportionate use on subgroups would serve Taylor's goal of pro-
tecting the community mean represented in the jury. This may have
been the situation that existed in Wheeler and Soares.6
On the other hand, the social distribution might be symmetrical
about the mean, with extremes on both sides equally far away.I6O If
members of a subgroup are again supposed to occupy one of the ex-
tremes, the disproportionate removal of that subgroup will have ab-
solutely no effect on the jury's mean impact. The effect of these
removals would be fully offset by the removal of jurors at the other
extreme. In such a case, a rule protecting subgroups by limiting the
peremptory would shift the jury's mean away from that of society,
toward the extreme at which the protected group clustered. Under
these circumstances, limiting the peremptory would cause the jury to
be unrepresentative. This too might have been the situation that ob-
tained in Wheeler and Soares; it is impossible to know which of these
two situations exists simply from observing that disproportionate
65. In both these cases the prosecution struck a disproportionate number of blacks
without advancing any reason for its action other than verdict tendencies believed to be
associated with race.






symmetric with subgroup at one extreme
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numbers of a subgroup are challenged. ' Only if that subgroup is at an
extreme of an asymmetrical social distribution will limiting the pe-
remptory protect representation of the community. Otherwise, such a
limitation would distort the community mean.
Numerous other distributions of verdict impact in society can be
imagined. In those that are symmetrical but that do not have a sub-
group clustered at one end, both the normal and limited peremptory
will have no systematic effect on the jury's mean. In those that are
asymmetrical but that have subgroups distributed evenly throughout,
both the normal and limited peremptory will distort the jury mean
toward the nearer extreme. There is currently no empirical evidence
as to which distribution exists in any given community for any range
of cases.68 In the absence of knowledge as to the actual distribution for
the geographic community from which a jury is drawn, neither the
normal nor the limited peremptory has a predictable, systematic effect
on the jury's mean verdict impact as compared to that of society.
Wheeler and Soares did not seek this information before limiting
the peremptory challenge. The courts reviewed disproportionate chal-
lenges to certain subgroups and simply determined that this use of the
peremptory was based on characteristics thought to be associated with
subgroup membership that they called "group bias."' 9 Wheeler and
Soares thus could be read to identify a situation in which one end of
the venire distribution was occupied by members of a subgroup. They
failed to determine, however, what the entire distribution looked like,
and in particular, the distance of the extremes from the mean. In the
67. Such a disproportionate removal of subgroup members on the basis of subgroup-
associated attitudes was all that was observed by the courts in Wheeler and Soares.
68. The question apparently never occurred to the courts in Wheeler or Soares. Neither
has it been a subject for scientific or empirical research. Such research on jury trials and
juries is generally concerned with other subjects. See, e.g., Adler, Socioeconomic Factors
Influencing Jury Verdicts, 3 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1973) (examining empirical
testing of effects of socio-economic disparity between jurors and defendants on verdicts);
Comment, Loaded for Acquittal? Psychiatry in the Jury Selection Process, 7 U.W.L.A.
L. REv. 199 (1975) (describing use of psychological survey techniques to identify favorable
jurors in criminal trials); Silver, A Case Against the Use of Public Opinion Polls as an
Aid in Jury Selection, 6 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & LAw 177 (1978) (describing and opposing
use of survey techniques on population); Sonaike, The Influence of Jury Deliberation on
Juror Perception of Trial, Credibility, and Damage Awards, 1978 BIGHAMT' YOUNG U.L.
REv. 889 (studying changes in juror perceptions resulting from deliberation).
69. In order to implement their rules, Wheeler and Soares design tests to determine
whether prospective jurors were being challenged on the basis of "group bias." See
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280-83, 583 P.2d at 764-66, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-07; Soares, 1979
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 628-32, 387 N.E.2d at 516-18. These tests should identify distributions in
which subgroups cluster at one or both ends of the spectrum, as the peremptory is used to
remove extremes of conviction tendency. Such a test will do nothing, however, to de-
termine how far those ends are from the mean as compared to the opposite extreme.
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absence of such information, it is impossible to say what effect any
disproportionate use of the peremptory has on the jury's mean as com-
pared to society's. Without such a judgment it is impossible to employ
the notion of impartiality inherent in Taylor. The holdings of Wheeler
and Soares thus do not represent a sound application of Taylor.
Instead, the state court cases represent constitutional adjudication on
the basis of empirical assumptions that the courts did not discuss and
could not prove. Moreover, such proof would be difficult to make. The
complaining party would have to furnish a convincing operational def-
inition of verdict impact and a way to measure it in society for a broad
range of cases.70 In addition, empirical research would have to demon-
strate that the social distribution of verdict impact was significantly
asymmetrical about the mean,71 and that a social subgroup occupied the
more distant extreme. The court would have to determine a means by
which to extend the rule to all situations of sufficient asymmetry, to
identify those situations and to keep the rule current as society's dis-
tribution changed over time.7 2
In any event, the question depends on an empirical showing about
the social verdict impact distribution,73 a showing that was not made in
70. This would necessitate measurement substantially more accurate than that required
or made by real attorneys in exercising the peremptory. See pp. 1189-90 supra.
71. In fact, both research and adjudication on these issues should focus primarily on
identifying asymmetrical distributions and only secondarily on social subgroups as they
are commonly understood. The distorting effect of the symmetrical peremptory depends
on the presence of a cluster at one end of an asymmetrical distribution, not on the fact of
that cluster's being occupied by members of a subgroup.
72. Moreover, this proof as to the distribution of verdict impact would have to be of
the kind and degree required for constitutional decisions. Holdings limiting the normal
operation of the statutory peremptory challenge rest, not on the courts' authority to
supervise the operation of the statutory scheme, but rather on the claim that the con-
stitutional requirement of impartiality overrides that scheme.
73. Only an empirical showing can even conceivably justify a limitation of the
peremptory, because the jury must represent the community. Since the peremptory
challenge is a device to further impartiality, see note 55 supra, the representational
component of impartiality must be respected by its operation; no use of the peremptory
that systematically renders the jury's mean verdict impact unrepresentative of society's can
be tolerated. It might, however, seem needlessly complicated to assess a state prosecutor's
use of the peremptory against certain groups in the context of the complex theory of
impartiality and representation developed in this Note; a prosecutor is bound by the
Fourteenth Amendment and may not discriminate against groups protected by it. Hence,
it could appear that whatever the Sixth Amendment scheme of impartiality, whatever
the point of jury representation and the peremptory challenge, a prosecutor at least may
not remove prospective jurors on the basis of certain characteristics. It is the whole
burden of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), however, that this is not the case. The
point of that much-criticized and possibly misunderstood opinion is that the use of the
peremptory on the basis of a good-faith judgment as to the prospective juror's likely
impact on the verdict is permitted, even if that judgment is based on information
normally proscribed for use by public officials-in Swain, race. Id. at 221-22. A prosecutor
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Wheeler or Soares. Without that information a court cannot apply the
rationale of impartiality and representation in Taylor to the peremp-
tory challenge.7 4 Unless the social distribution is known, there is no
way to say what the peremptory does to the jury's mean as compared to
society's. The subtle notion of impartiality and representation inherent
in Taylor protects society's mean verdict impact, not its demogTaphic
composition.
or a defense attorney uses the peremptory challenge properly, and thus comports with
the Sixth Amendment scheme of impartiality, when he challenges the juror most likely
to have an unfavorable impact on the verdict.
74. This requirement is a very high one. It might be objected that if the demands
of systematic inquiry set a standard that cannot be met, then s)stematic methods should
be abandoned and courts left free to rely on their intuitions as to the distribution of
verdict impact in society. This still does not justify Wheeler and Soares, however, for they
do not rest on even an intuitive claim that the cxtremes of the distribution of verdict
impact occupied by members of subgroups are farther from the community mean than
the other extremes. Rather, those decisions rely on a literal definition of impartiality as
subgroup cross-sectionality and avoid asking the questions raised here by assuming that
subgroups have qualitatively different viewpoints rather than that they occupy different
positions on the continuous scale of verdict impact. The California court evidences this
simplistic thinking when it argues that juries from which subgroups have been eliminated
will reflect the "prejudices of the majority," again assuming that different groups cannot
"represent" one another. 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902-03. This
is as close as Wheeler comes to addressing the real issue of the distribution of attitudes
with respect to subgroup membership.
Moreover, to say that courts may rely on their intuitions as to the effect of the peremp-
tory on the jury's representation function is to give to judges an unguided and unreview-
able discretion to police representation as they see fit. Confronted with black defendants
and near or total exclusion of black veniremen, any court will be tempted to invoke its
discretion and imitate the decisions in Wheeler and Soares. Some evidence more persua-
sive than a court's feeling about a phenomenon it can neither measure nor even observe
should underlie constitutional adjudication of the requirement of an impartial jury.
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